

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 BONN 08564 01 OF 04 091854Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----053027 091857Z /72

O P 091842Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8369  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 08564

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, UR, GW  
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG

REFS: A) BONN 8421; B) BONN 8039; C) BONN 8320  
(ALL NOTAL)

SUMMARY: SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD ME  
THAT THEY ARE PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE BREZHNEV  
VISIT, WHICH THEY BELIEVE HAS ACHIEVED ITS PRINCIPAL  
GOAL OF ADDING AN ELEMENT OF STABILITY TO THE FRG-  
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AS BOTH SIDES PREPARE FOR THE  
FORTHCOMING TRANSITION IN MOSCOW. COMMENT-  
ING ALONG SIMILAR LINES, SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS HERE  
HAVE TOLD THE GERMANS THAT THEY, TOO, ARE SATISFIED  
THAT RELATIONS HAVE BEEN KEPT ON AN EVEN KEEL.  
CONCRETE RESULTS WERE MINIMAL, HOWEVER, AND IN  
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OPERATIONAL TERMS IT WILL BE A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE  
THE VISIT'S EFFECT CAN BE MEASURED.

ON BERLIN, THE GERMANS DID NOT ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH  
(NOR DID THEY EXPECT ONE) THOUGH THEY SEE SOME HOPE  
FOR INCREASED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY IN THE FUTURE. AT  
THE SAME TIME, BREZHNEV SEEMED CRITICAL OF THE PROSPECT

THAT SCHMIDT WOULD ACCOMPANY QUEEN ELIZABETH AND PRESIDENT CARTER TO BERLIN.

ON DISARMAMENT, DISCUSSION WAS NON-POLEMICAL AND THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE VISIT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO AN INCREASE IN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. BREZHNEV WAS "VERY CRITICAL" OF US POSITIONS ON SALT. ON MBFR, HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE DATA ISSUE WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND ANOTHER SOVIET OFFICIAL SAID MOSCOW WAS PREPARING A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, THERE WAS NOTHING CONCRETE BEYOND THE SIGNING OF THE LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT. THROUGHOUT THE VISIT SOVIET OFFICIALS STRESSED THEIR DESIRE FOR AN INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE WITH THE FRG AT ALL LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

1. ON THE EVENING OF MAY 8, I MET WITH FOREIGN OFFICE POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH, DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER RUTH, AND FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTOR OF SOVIET AFFAIRS KUEHN FOR A BRIEFING ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT. IN SUMMING UP THE VISIT BLECH SAID THE FRG ANALYSIS WAS POSITIVE. THE FRG'S PRIMARY GOAL IN RECEIVING BREZHNEV HAD BEEN TO STABILIZE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHILE THE SOVIET LEADER WAS STILL AT THE HELM. WHILE THERE HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE AGREEMENTS, BLECH WAS RELATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

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OPTIMISTIC THAT THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND GENERALLY POSITIVE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT ADD THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF STABILITY THAT WAS SOUGHT BY BONN IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW.

2. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS, BLECH AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY, TOO, WERE SATISFIED WITH THE VISIT. ONE SOVIET OFFICIAL HAD SAID MOSCOW'S MODERATE EXPECTATIONS HAD BEEN MET AND ITS PRIMARY GOAL HAD BEEN ATTAINED, I.E. THE CONTINUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP ALTHOUGH OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS (READ BREZHNEV'S HEALTH AND UNCERTAINTIES IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS) DO NOT PERMIT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT. THIS SOVIET OFFICIAL SAID BREZHNEV HAD BEEN SINCERELY CONCERNED THAT DETENTE COULD BE OVERSHADOWED BY OTHER PROBLEMS AND HAD WANTED TO KEEP IT ALIVE. MY GERMAN INTERLOCUTORS SEEMED TO SHARE THIS SOVIET ANALYSIS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT. BLECH WAS CAUTIOUS IN POINTING OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VISIT WOULD ONLY BECOME APPARENT IN SOVIET POSITIONS ON BERLIN AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

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ACTION SS-25

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O P 091842Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8370  
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USMISSION USNATO  
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3. BERLIN. THIS HAD BEEN ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL DISCUSSION TOPICS BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND BREZHNEV. THE GERMANS WERE SURPRISED THAT BREZHNEV HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE SINCE IN THE PAST HE HAD ALWAYS DEFERRED TO GROMYKO. NONETHELESS, HE OBVIOUSLY HAD BEEN BRIEFED CAREFULLY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HAD NOT DEVIATED FROM STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS.

4. IN THEIR TETE-A-TETE ON MAY 5 SCHMIDT HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE FRG HAD NO INTENTION OF CHANGING THE STATUS OF BERLIN AND FULLY RECOGNIZED THAT BERLIN WAS NOT A CONSTITUENT PART OF THE FRG. AT THE SAME TIME, SCHMIDT HAD STRESSED THAT BONN WISHED TO CONTINUE DEVELOPING TIES WITH THE CITY ALONG THE LINES OF THE QA AND NOT FOR PURPOSES OF DEMONSTRATION. SCHMIDT SAID THE FRG HAD NO INTENTION OF EXPANDING THE FEDERAL PRESENCE IN THE CITY. SCHMIDT HAD MENTIONED THE ALLIED AND SOVIET PATROLS, NOT IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "ABSURD  
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HARASSMENT" THAT PRESIDENT SCHEEL HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO. SCHMIDT HAD MENTIONED THE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR BERLIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE QA. (BREZHNEV HAD NOT REPLIED AND THERE WAS NO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT.)

5. IN HIS PREPARED RESPONSE, BREZHNEV HAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QA AND SAID IT WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING ON BERLIN. HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT FRICTION ON BERLIN AND DESIRED TO KEEP MATTERS UNCOMPLICATED. THE SOVIET LEADER SAID THAT, WHILE SOME PROVISIONS OF THE QA WERE SUBJECT TO DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS, WHAT REALLY MATTERED WAS THE POLITICAL APPROACH OF BOTH SIDES. BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED THAT MOSCOW DID NOT WANT TO MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR BERLIN AND THAT THE EAST GERMANS HAD SIMILAR GOOD INTENTIONS. BREZHNEV SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT MANY WEST GERMANS WERE OF A SIMILAR MIND AND FOR THIS REASON HE WAS OPTIMISTIC OVER THE FUTURE OF BERLIN.

6. AT ONE STAGE IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS, SCHMIDT HAD SAID HE MIGHT WELL ACCOMPANY QUEEN ELIZABETH AND PRESIDENT CARTER TO BERLIN AS THEIR HONORARY ESCORT. HE HAD UNDERLINED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A GOVERNMENT FUNCTION. BREZHNEV APPARENTLY GRUMBLED AT THIS, INDICATING THAT SCHMIDT'S DOING SO COULD BE SEEN AS AN UNHELPFUL DEMONSTRATION OF FEDERAL PRESENCE IN THE CITY. SCHMIDT COUNTERED BY SAYING THE QUEEN AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD VISIT THE CITY IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, WOULD BE GREETED BY THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES, AND HIS

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ACCOMPANIMENT WOULD BE NO MORE THAN AN ACT OF COURTESY WHICH SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. THIS DISCUSSION APPARENTLY ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY AND WE WILL REQUEST FURTHER DETAILS IN THE BONN GROUP.

7. IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSIONS ON BERLIN, BLECH SAID NO BREAKTHROUGH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED NOR HAD ONE BEEN EXPECTED. HE DID, HOWEVER, INTERPRET BREZHNEV'S REMARKS AND HIS NON-POLEMICAL MOOD AS SHOWING SOME HOPE OF INCREASED FLEXIBILITY IN THE FUTURE BY THE SOVIETS. CONTINUING, BLECH SAID, "IF THE DISCUSSION HASN'T OPENED THE DOOR A BIT ON BERLIN, AT LEAST THE

DOOR HAS NOT BEEN LOCKED." HE SAID AN EARLY INDICATION OF FUTURE SOVIET ATTITUDES ON BERLIN WILL BE THEIR REACTION TO THE FRG PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE CONSULAR SERVICES FOR WEST BERLINERS NOT PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT THE FRG PROPOSALS AS PRESENTED (AND, INDEED, THE FRG DID NOT SUCCEED IN ATTAINING APPROVAL OF THE STATEMENT OUTLINED PARA 4, REF B - ONLY A PROMISE TO "CONSIDER IT"), HE THOUGHT THEIR FINAL POSITION COULD BE INDICATIVE OF THE ATTITUDE THEY WOULD TAKE ON OTHER MATTERS INVOLVING THE CITY.

8. DISARMAMENT: DISCUSSION HAD BEEN NON-POLEMICAL WITH BOTH SIDES PUTTING FORTH THEIR DIFFERENT POSITIONS WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRIORITY OF THIS AREA. BLECH THOUGHT THE EXCHANGES MIGHT LEAD TO MORE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL IN THE FUTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE. BLECH SAID THE FRG HAD

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O P 091842Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8371  
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REPRESENTED NATO POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS. BLECH THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE WESTERN INTEREST IN "APPROXIMATE BALANCE AND PARITY" HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION (ARTICLE III). HE ALSO ATTACHED SIGNIFICANCE TO THE DECLARATION'S FORMULA-

TION (AGAIN IN ARTICLE III) THAT DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATIONS MEASURES IN THE "NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FIELDS" WOULD BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

9. SALT: BREZHNEV HAD BEEN "VERY CRITICAL" OF THE USG POSITION ON SALT. HE HAD ACCUSED THE US OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES AND RAISING OBSTACLES TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BREZHNEV HAD SAID THAT "IT MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON SALT II." IN REPLY SCHMIDT HAD SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SINCERELY WANTED AN AGREEMENT. HE HAD ALSO NOTED TO BREZHNEV THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN APPROVING AN AGREEMENT AND THE EFFECT THAT SOVIET-AFRICAN POLICY WAS HAVING ON US PARLIAMENTARIANS. BREZHNEV HAD NOT

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REACTED TO SCHMIDT'S PRESENTATION. BLECH SAID NON-CIRCUMVENTION HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AND THAT CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS HAD COME UP ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF BREZHNEV'S CITING THEM AS AN EXAMPLE OF US PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

10. MBFR: BREZHNEV HAD STRESSED THAT PARITY ALREADY EXISTED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE WHOLE TENOR OF THE DEBATE ON THIS POINT INDICATED THAT THE DATA DISCUSSIONS WERE OF KEY IMPORTANCE AND WOULD BE DIFFICULT. SOVIET MBFR REP TARASOV HAD SAID MOSCOW WAS PREPARING A REACTION TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE AS WELL AS A COUNTER-PROPOSAL. NEITHER TARASOV NOR BREZHNEV HAD CHARACTERIZED THE WESTERN INITIATIVE.

11. GRAY-AREA SYSTEMS: SCHMIDT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SOVIET CONVENTIONAL AND MIDDLE-RANGE SUPERIORITY WAS A DESTABILIZING FACTOR. WHILE NOT DOUBTING BREZHNEV'S OWN INTENTIONS, SCHMIDT HAD POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS CONCERNED OVER SOVIET POTENTIAL. IN PARTICULAR, THE SS-20 AS WELL AS THE GRAY AREA IN GENERAL WERE A MATTER OF CONCERN. SCHMIDT HAD ALSO CITED SOVIET TANK AND MANPOWER DISPARITY, PRESENTING THE SOVIET LEADER WITH DETAILED FIGURES.

12. BREZHNEV HAD RESPONDED THAT PARITY ALREADY EXISTED AND THAT, IN FACT, IT WAS THE BUNDESWEHR THAT WAS GROWING IN STRENGTH. (SCHMIDT COUNTERED THAT THESE WERE QUALITATIVE INCREASES ONLY.) BREZHNEV HAD ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT THAT GRAY-AREA SYSTEMS SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION. HE HAD NOT MENTIONED SPECIFIC INSTANCES BUT RATHER HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO REDUCE ON THE

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BASIS OF MUTUALITY. BREZHNEV HAD ALSO RAISED THE WELL-KNOWN SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A FREEZE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, NON-FIRST USE, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF MASS-DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS.

13. ERW: REPEATING HIS MAY 4 TOAST (REFTEL C), BREZHNEV HAD EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THE ERW. HE HAD ACCUSED THE FRG OF ADOPTING A NEBULOUS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE AND NOTED THAT "EVEN SOME HIGH GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SUPPORTED ERW DEPLOYMENT." IN HIS REPLY, SCHMIDT HAD REFERRED TO HIS BUNDESTAG SPEECH, NOTING THAT ERW MUST BE LOOKED AT IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF WEAPONRY RATHER THAN IN ISOLATION.

14. MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS: DURING NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW ON THE JOINT DECLARATION, THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED AN UNACCEPTABLE FORMULATION ON THIS SUBJECT. THE GERMANS HAD TABLED COUNTER-LANGUAGE AND THE MATTER HAD BEEN POSTPONED. TO THE GERMANS' SURPRISE, THE SOVIETS EVENTUALLY DROPPED THE MATTER ENTIRELY. SIMILARLY, THE SOVIETS HAD INITIALLY WISHED TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO ERW IN THE DECLARATION BUT ALSO HAD DROPPED THIS PROPOSAL AFTER THE GERMANS EXPRESSED OPPOSITION.

15. ECONOMIC: THERE HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS BEYOND THOSE DEALING WITH THE LONG-TERM AGREEMENT. BLECH POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREEMENT DID NOT COMMIT THE FRG TO ANY INCREASES OF GUARANTEE CEILINGS. BLECH WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC AS TO THE PROSPECTS FOR FLESHING OUT THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8372  
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USMISSION USNATO  
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WITH CONCRETE PROJECTS. HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE LIMITATIONS ON GERMAN INDUSTRY'S ABILITY TO ACCEPT COMPENSATION DEALS, AS WELL AS A RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT FURTHER CREDITS. HE THOUGHT THE BALL WAS NOW IN THE COURT OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE SOME IMAGINATION ON THEIR PART TO WORK OUT SUBSTANTIVE DEALS. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH STATE SECRETARY HERMES, HE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THE FRG SIDE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH PATOLICHEV'S PRESENTATION ON ECONOMIC AND TRADE MATTERS, WHICH HAD CONSISTED LARGELY OF BANALITIES.

16. THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS, AT BOTH SUMMIT AND PLENARY LEVEL, THE SOVIETS HAD STRESSED THEIR DESIRE FOR A CONTINUOUS AND INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE WITH THE FRG. THIS HAD BEEN A LEIT MOTIV OF THE VISIT. HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION OF FORMALIZED DISCUSSIONS AT ANY LEVEL EXCEPT ON UN AFFAIRS.

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17. SEPTTEL FOLLOWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES DISCUSSED DURING THE VISIT. STOESSEL.

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## Message Attributes

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